Analysis on Bilateral Relations between Brazil and the EU from the Soft Balancing Perspective

Ⅰ. Introduction

Soft balancing, which had been discussed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, explores the manner in which second-tier great powers respond to the domination and heading of an international system by the United States (US). On one hand, the traditional theory of hard balancing focuses on the equilibrium relationship from the military strategy of powers. On the other hand, soft balancing concentrates on how second-tier great powers become strategically interested in countering the super powers by means other than military power.

In this paper, soft balancing is used to explain the core of power conversion, taking the strategic partnership between Brazil and the European Union (EU) as a case study. Strategic partnership is a form of soft balancing and is not a formal alliance to counter the military threat from the US. However, strategic partnership aims to constrain and offset the strong military and economic power of the US through economic, cultural, and institutional power (Ferguson 2012, 199). The EU and its strategic partners established a strategic alliance formed by the link of an issue. Brazil is strongly autonomous and does not always have the same side with the EU on different issues. Both parties agree on the development of cooperation, climate change, and other issues, with significant differences in market access, security, and other affairs. Their bilateral relations have shown a strategic alliance formed by the link of an issue which excludes the cooperation on hard military issues and selects the coalition on soft issues to construct a basic strategy of soft balancing.

From the historical and cultural perspectives, Brazil was deeply influenced by the traditional power of Europe, and it is one of the most pro-European countries in Latin America. Brazil is politically influenced by the third wave of democratization in the Southern European countries. When the Brazilian military government stepped down in 1985 and the power was returned to the civilian government, Brazil entered into the Nova República. Brazil gradually turned away from the alternate stage of populism and authoritarianism toward the steady development of democracy. Until 2011, the EU has been the main source of investment and export market of Brazil and the latter has become the only strategic partner of the EU in South America. As the largest country in South America, Brazil is ranked the seventh largest economy in the world, also an important member of MERCOSUR (el Mercado Común del Sur; the Southern Common Market) and one of the emerging BRICS countries (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

The rise of Brazil caused it to rethink its national strategy. Brazil’s basic diplomatic strategy in Latin America is to compete with the US. However, the EU is not the only entity that Brazil wants to attract. Brazil’s strategy is now geared toward multi-oriented development and alliance. This study paper adopts the concept of soft balancing to analyze how Brazil can maintain its stable development with powers. First of all, the concept of soft balancing will be analyzed. Secondly, it will be addressed what the factors cause Brazil to adopt a balancing, bandwagoning, or another strategy? The third part discusses the differences in the bilateral position between Brazil and the EU in terms of trade, development, environmental change, and security. The forth explains how Brazil maintains its independent diplomatic policy considering its competition and cooperation with the EU? And the final part concludes the debates.

Ⅱ. Soft Balancing

Soft balancing is established on traditional power balance theory. Waltz’s structural balance of power focuses on the structure of the system, and the main reason for international stability is the balance of interaction in the level of systems. Excessive concentration of power is prevented through power distribution to maintain the stability of the international community and regional security (Waltz 1979, Chapter 6). Such a self-help system urges national behavior to lean toward power balancing. Hegemony, as defined by Waltz, is having power without an apparent opponent. Secondary hegemony attempts to balance the supremacy. When a part of the international system is in a state of anarchy, the sovereign states attempt to strengthen and safeguard their interests by expanding their power for them to survive. One method to expand their power is to enhance their strength and effectively use domestic resource allocation, which will improve the domestic economy and enrich their arms. Another method is to seek an alliance with other countries to counter or weaken each other. Walt further explained the alliance behavior and believed that alliance plays an important role in the power balancing system, which in turn, has an effect of balancing and bandwagoning (Walt 1987, 110–117). Balancing and bandwagoning are related; the latter is a type of balance of power, where small countries accept the dominant position of hegemony, then, take unilateral restrictions on domestic policies to meet the preferences of the dominant power to maintain the relationship with the hegemony.

Walt and Waltz believed that balancing possesses more common effects than bandwagoning. For example, the balance system formed by the European countries since the Peace of Westphalia is widespread (Walt 1987, 7-114). Some countries play the role of the balancer in certain regions or in the world to counter strong countries or powerful alliances. Examples are Britain in Europe, China in the Cold War Era, and Brazil in America. These countries attempted to play the role of the balancer. However, not all countries want to be a balancer. Some small countries often join strong countries that are under the umbrella of a big country. After the two World Wars, the US became more powerful than the Soviet Union. However, Western European countries did not choose to fight the US. Instead, they became the US’s allies against the Soviet Union. The difference is that the threat of the Soviet Union on Western Europe and Japan is higher than on the US. After the Cold War, Western European allies encountered more contradictions with the US in the open market and in the reduction of the greenhouse effect. Until the 911tragedy, terrorism brought a common threat tothe powers. The powers were briefly united because of these occurrences (Ou Xinhong and Hu Zhuqing 2012, 63).

The first correction shows a shift in balancing strategy. Traditional power balance focuses on balancing the power size. The corrected power balance shifts to the attention to their intentions and focuses on the balance of countries with threat intention. The corrected power balance is not simply against the power. Thus, balance theory of threats raised by Stephen Walt was formed (Yang Sanyi 2013, 166). Walt emphasized that aside from the power of hegemony, a country’s intention must be considered. In particular, behavior is the basis for secondary hegemony to decide if it should be balanced. The point of both power balances is that balance is based on the motivation of the system, rather than on specific events.

The second correction is a shift in the means of balance. The study on power has been the core idea of realism. Carr divided the international power into three types, namely, military force, economic power, and the power dominating other opinions. Six principles of political realism raised by Morgenthau (1978, 4–21) defined interests by power. Moreover, the pursuit of power has become the goal of all countries.

Traditional power balance theory focuses on the hard balancing relationship among powers produced through military means and adopted to safeguard the interests of military strategy (Gan Yihua 2008, 2). Hard balancing is associated with the power having tangible indicators in the classification of power. The tangible indicators include geographical position (existence of a natural barrier, strategic location, or proximity to greater powers), population quality and structure, social demand level, food supplies and natural resources (coal, iron, petroleum, and the strategic resources associated with national defense industry), economy, and military force. The power is simplified as a tangible and measurable resource and disregards other categories of power indicators. Therefore, such an analysis of the national power factor will easily produce misleading results. Power resource is a tangible or intangible tool that is relative to the relationship with the power. Whether a particular resource can produce the desired outcome depends on the intention of the actor. Resources are transformed to powers to achieve desired results. The transformation of power, that is, transforming resources into results, has become the critical intervening variable. Therefore, the key is not the kind of power resource to have, but on the ways to use it to effectively transform power resource into the strategy (Li Jingyi 2011, 30–31).

In this paper, the correction of the balancing strategy and balance means constitute the concept of soft balancing. The existing international relation shows a 3D chess game (Li Jingyi 2011, 30–31). With the military field being the top layer of the board, the US enjoys a unipolar advantage; with the economic field in the second layer of the board, a multipolar situation is observed. The US, Japan, the EU, and BRICS play important roles. The overall economic scale of the EU is greater than that of the US. With their rapidly growing population, economy, and resources, China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies become increasingly important. Meanwhile, the lower layer of the board shows a power deconcentration that crosses national boundaries. An increasing number of affairs have gone beyond the scope of government control. These affairs include all kinds of non-state actors, and transnational challenges derived from globalization, such as water pollution, diseases, climate change, and other issues of this kind.

Scholars are evaluating the lack of military alliance against the US (hard power). However, they should be thinking on how to use the (soft) force besides military power to counter the hegemony of the US in the international system (Whitaker 2010, 1 - 110). In the Introduction, soft balancing is not intended to directly challenge the military advantages of the US. Instead, it uses non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine unilateral acts of aggression by the US in the military. This process can be achieved by regional or international multilateral institutions, economic strategies, and diplomatic arrangements (2005, 10). Other scholars raised similar observations. Paul believed that the secondary power gradually uses the soft balancing strategy to counter unilateral acts of aggression of the US military after the Cold War. However, these acts do not harm the economic interests of the secondary power and the US (2005, 70). Soft balancing, as defined by Fergusan, includes the non-military alliance of both countries to reduce or remove the military behavior and the external influence of foreign powers in particular regions (2012, 200). Whitaker believed that for weak countries, when any military action is taken against the foreign force to reduce its influence, or when cooperation is taken as the response to security threats, these actions are all expressions of soft balancing (2010, 110).

Globalization further diversified the definition of the relevant issues of the interests of power. Therefore, the dominance of the military and the economy is no longer overwhelming; the state no longer has a unique role in the global affairs; security is not the only goal that the country should pursue; force is not the only choice to achieve the goal (Keohane and Nye 1989, 27-28). Soft balancing focuses on non-military means, particularly diplomacy and construction, in which super powers and secondary powers can expand the bargaining spacethrough different policies. These policies may ease the threats on the existing situation that the conflict of interests among powers may bring. If secondary powers can integrate their policies against super powers, then the costs of unilateral acts of super powers will be increased, the dominant advantage of super powers will be eroded, and the dictatorial power imposed on other roles will be weakened.

Ⅲ. Construction of Brazil’s Soft Balancing

Before discussing Brazil’s national strategy, the relative position of the country in the world and in Latin America must be clarified. Brazil and Mexico are known as the two biggest countries in Latin America. However, the relations of these countries to the US are different. Mexico refused to join the Central American community (changed to Central American Common Market, CACM) in the 1960s, which led the countries in Central America to compete with the US. Instead, Mexico chose to join the Northern powers, forming the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) with the US and Canada. Compared with Mexico’s method of bandwagoning with the US, Brazil’s traditional diplomatic strategy is “balancing the US position and bandwagoning the EU” (Gratius 2012, 7). The definitions of balancing and bandwagoning explain the basic coping approach between the US and the EU with Brazil. Brazil knows that resisting the US is difficult because of its strength. However, Brazil does not want to ally with the US, but instead wants to draw the attractive EU to itself. On one hand, Brazil effectively utilizes its national resources and its own strengths in specific areas to establish its regional influence. On the other hand, Brazil shows its relative power and confidence to enhance its national autonomy and expand its power in international politics.

First of all, in terms of territory and population, Brazil is slightly less than the United States, Russia, and China. However, on the influence of global affairs and the degree of involvement, Brazil is far less engaged than the aforementioned countries. Brazil has the largest military budget in South America, and it ranks as the 10th military power in the world. However, Brazil still needs to prove they can become a military power. Brazil has the largest economy in South America, but it is not the richest country. Argentina and Chile have a higher personal income and human development index than Brazil. With a surging wealth gap, the development assistance to neighbors or other developing countries in South America is not high. Brazil has rich, raw materials, mineral resources, and a vast market, and it is a big, agricultural exporting country, which attracts more foreign investments. Brazil has an effective bargaining chip in international negotiations, but no economic leverage exists to make this country become a regional leader.

On Brazil’s foreign policy, Brazil was influenced by the Portuguese colonial tradition. Thus, its historical background, culture, and religion are similar to the values of Europe. Politically, Brazil agrees with democratic rule, social welfare system, and the integration model of European countries. Economically, Brazil is closely related to the EU, particularly Spain and Portugal, and experienced an aggravated, complicated situation after joining the EU in 1986 (Bizzozero 2004, 101). These special relations entrusted to the EU by Brazil established the understanding and mutual trust of partnership, and laid a solid foundation for bilateral political and economic relations. However, compared with the pro-West countries, Brazil’s traditional diplomatic orientation is to compete with the US, bandwagon with the EU, and remain partial to anti-American and pro-European ideology (Gratius 2012, 7). For example, Brazil boycotts the Free Trade Area of the Americas promoted by the US; the Free Trade Area was formed by the US and Central America by merging with the Free Trade Zone established by South American countries (Faust 2004, 56; Teló 2007, 138); Brazil boycotts many proposals of the US in the United Union (refer to cases in Chapter 4 of this paper), excludes Mexico–Latin America’s major competitors, entices Latin American countries with similar anti-American ideologies, and combines the third forces of the EU to counter the US. In other words, excluding the US as the main force, Brazil chose an alliance with the EU and other South American countries to diversify its national economy and diplomacy. These choices highlight the heterogeneity of the status of the Western identity of the country (Malamud 2011, 6).

The second identity is embodied in the regional integration in South America to construct a space that combines geopolitics and geoeconomics through Brazil’s promotion. For Brazil, South America is not merely a geographical region, but a highly autonomous political and economic region. This feature reduces the external influence of the US. Meanwhile, this identity can be used to enhance Brazil’s power. The important indicators of which are the reconciliation between Brazil and Argentina and the establishment of MERCOSUR in 1994. MERCOSUR originated from the concept of the security community that refers to the two big countries in the region, Brazil and Argentina, which established reconciliation and mutual trust, abandoned the development of nuclear weapons program, and reached a mutual non-aggression agreement (Bizzozero 2004, 101). Another indicator is the South America Community (changed to Union of South American Nations, UNASUR) established in 2004, with the purpose of drawing the Andean group and the South American Market under these two regional organizations, together with Chile, Guyana, Suriname, and other countries. With the dominance of Brazil, UNASUR focuses on the development, anti-imperialism, nationalism, and formation of the state alliance with a leftist ideology. Brazil pushes MERCOSUR to develop as the core of the UNASUR, without taking further risks. Meanwhile, the leading position of Brazil in South America is stable (Malamud 2011, 6–7).

The third identity is embodied in the South–South Cooperation Strategy promoted by Brazil. Brazil along with China and India intends to establish a multilateral multipolarity against hegemony based on political realism and the national power balance system. The concept of multilateral multipolarity against hegemony popularized in this country comes from its active cooperation with developing countries. On one hand, it emphasizes the development of friendly relationship with its neighbors in South America and strengthens regional cooperation. On the other hand, it turns to the members of BRICS, such as The India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) formed with India and South Africa, and becomes a member of G8+G5 under The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the five BRICS countries.¹⁾ By forming alliances with China, India, South Africa, and other developing countries, Brazil strengthens the South–South Cooperation, instead of the traditional pattern of South–North Alliance (Gratius 2012, 9). The practical strategy adopted by Brazil helps it to reach the third road in foreign relations. Since 2011, Asia has become the major source of investment and export market of Brazil, followed by the EU, and the US. Politically, the traditional pro-EU is changed and the Western identity is no longer seen as the only option in the development of foreign relations. The economic bandwagoning with the EU and US in the past gradually changed and is now geared toward China and India in Asia. By enhancing the integration of the South American market, the situation of the four divisions, namely, Asia, the EU, the US, and South America, is formed(Gratius 2012, 7).

The three identities constitute the diplomatic characteristics of soft balancing emphasized by Brazil in which it positions itself as a medium or regional power. With the social influence, medium power can be recognized by other countries. This social power is based on three kinds of influence: economically, physically or politically coercive means; these include persuasiveness and ideological norms (Malamud 2011, 3). The first two kinds of influence are regarded as one and are generally defined as hard power, which uses economic or military force to influence the behaviors or interests of other countries. The third kind of influence is soft power, which tends to reach national targets through cooperation and attraction, rather than through sanctions and threats. As Brazil lacks the means for hard power, under the condition of having no sticks and carrots, Brazil concentrates its resources on the use of normative power (Malamud 2011, 5; Wang Huiling 2013). This kind of development is seen as follows. As a founding member of the United Nations (UN), Brazil is one of the major budget contributing countries. In 1992 and 2012, it hosted the Global Sustainability Summit, which focuses on global greenhouse effect and sustainable development. Under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Brazil plays the major role of Doha round of negotiations, and Roberto Azevedo from Brazil is currently the WTO Secretary General (Bourcier 2013).Together with Germany, India, and Japan, Brazil actively seeks to be added as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, this move was opposed by Mexico and Argentina, which are associated with Italy and South Korea. Brazil plays an important role in the construction of a multilateral equilibrium in international affairs, which is the basic strategy of Brazil in seeking an independent foreign policy.

Ⅳ. Multilateral and Bilateral Strategy of Brazil and the EU

The great part of the relationship between Brazil and the EU is pressed in the framework of MERCOSUR. As its name implies, MERCOSUR aims to establish a single, internal market. Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are the four countries that agreed to remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the transition period from 1991 to 1994; and the countries reached an agreement on the common external tariff (Bizzozero 2004, 101; Faust 2004, 45-50). In December1994, these countries signed the Protocol of Ouro Preto in Brazil. The countries developed an organizational structure and gave the international legal status to MERCOSUR to open the inter-regional negotiation with the EU. In 1995, MERCOSUR signed the third-generation cooperation agreement with the EU to replace the first- and secondgeneration cooperation agreement that was dubbed as empty shell (Santander, 2005: 291). Both parties developed relations in trade, cooperation, and political dialogue to reach a consensus on the development of cooperation that drives the economy and trade. The political dialogue resolved the economic and trade disputes to establish the basis for future bilateral negotiations on the Association Agreement. Since 2006, the trade policy of the EU emphasized a double-track development in Asia and Latin America (European Commission 2006, 2). In Latin America, the EU signed the Free Trade Agreement with six Central American countries, Columbia, and Peru, respectively (2010)(European Commission 2013a). The analysis on the subsequent effects of these free trade agreements helped extend the trade negotiations of the EU with other South American countries (Briceño Ruiz 2006). In addition to economic and trade relations, the EU has established a strategic partnership with big countries in Latin America, such as Brazil and Mexico (European Commission 2013b), to individually develop bilateral relations with the two countries (Renard 2011, 1-23). The differences in the bilateral position between Brazil and the EU are discussed from four aspects, namely, trade, development, environmental change, and security.

Ⅴ. Evaluation: Closer partner？

Three diplomatic identities of Brazil and four international issues are used to construct the bilateral relations between Brazil and the EU. These identities are reflected in the triple status of Brazil’s foreign relations. First, Brazil is attempting to become the leader of South America. Second, Brazil is an emerging economy. Third, Brazil is a pro-West/Europe Latin American country (Gratius 2012, 11). The triple status interactively influences the orientation of Brazil’s foreign relations.

Wu Yushan formed several conclusions by examining the relationships among the 14 republics of the former Soviet Union and Russia (1997a, 76–78). Foreign policy is achieved through political wrangling among the political groups that advocate balance or claims counter and the transformation of leadership; for neighbors facing power, balancing (countering) and bandwagoning (retaining) is the only choice, without mutually equal relations. Deciding which kind of policy to use depends on the dependency level of economic development; if the dependency level is low, the country is more able to adopt a counter policy. Foreign aid becomes an important factor in formulating the national policy. If allies have more parties, they can counter more powers. These conditions are also applicable in examining the transformation of relations between Brazil and the EU.

One condition is the intention of leaders. MERCOSUR was established after the Treaty of Asunción was signed in the period of President Collor (Fernando Collor 1990-1992). During the period of President Cardoso (Fernando Henrique Cardoso 1995-2003), Brazil was regarded as a medium country that allies with developing countries and adopts a collective leadership style to push regional diplomacy to consolidate the leadership of Brazil in South America. This conceptual change came from the pragmatic and diversified foreign policy that had been pursued since President Lula (2003-2011) came to power. The transformation seeks opportunities for international power expansion. However, with the strong competition among neighboring countries, maintaining a peaceful and stable development with its strong neighbors has become a problem that Brazil cannot ignore. With the dominance of the US, Latin American countries can only choose between balancing and bandwagoning. The mutually equal relations exist. The US possesses uncontroverted strengths in national power. Thus, the decision of the US to consider the neighboring countries as its sphere of influence is natural. However, the rise of Brazil makes breaks the balance of the power situation in America, and Brazil wants to develop equal relations with the EU and the US. Brazil is reluctant to ally with the US; thus, it began to counter the US by allying with a foreign power—the EU. Meanwhile, the EU signed a connection agreement with Chile, Peru, and Columbia. The trade negotiations with MERCOSUR reflect the attempt of the EU to generate cooperation in intensive regions in South America and to expand their relations with South American countries. EU is now a big competitor of the US in Latin America; thus, Brazil is given a chance to choose. In particular, Brazil has been trying to diversify its foreign economic relations to maintain an independent diplomatic space. The attempt of Brazil to ally with the EU is obviously a response to the NAFTA and the Central American Free Trade Area. It intends to reduce the influence of the US in the Southern hemisphere (Rüland 2002, 4). The triangular interaction among the EU, South America, and the US led to the following results. The US dominated the NAFTA and the Central American Free Trade Area. The EU pushed free trade with MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR, which is headed by Brazil, plays the role of being an inter-regional link. Thus, an excessive, non-equilateral triangle will not be formed (Hardacre 2010, 89-90; Santander 2005, 293; Söderbaum et al. 2005, 374).

Such inter-regional interaction implies competitive pressure. The interaction allows national or regional actors to compensate for their deficiency in international influence or increase their political forces through alliances. Such a political motivation to expand its influence often goes beyond free trade agreement and is purely in consideration of commerce. However, the political dialogue and partnership between Brazil and the EU does not reflect the same prospects of both parties. Brazil’s international position has changed, but the established concepts and paradigms still dominate the bilateral relations. Brazil is still positioned as a Southern country. For example, for immigration, peace, climate change issues, the EU still regards Brazil as a developing country, like in the traditional asymmetric North–South Relations.

Second, the international environment is simply combined with economic factors. Raw materials and energy are the major variables of global economic development. Western industrial powers pay more attention to emerging countries again. Brazil made full use of its natural resources and its advantages with the development of biomass energy. Thus, it generated an excellent economic growth data. Therefore, the differences between the degree of economic development and the degree of economic dependence must be emphasized. Brazil will have difficulty to be in line with the global trading system. First, the rise of Brazil’s economy did not reduce the country’s dependence on foreign investment and trade. Second, Brazil still maintains a high protectionism for products, which is the highest among BRICS countries. With Brazil’s low manufacturing export ratio, it highly depends on basic commodities. In 2011, the export ratio of primary necessities accounted for 65% of total exports (Gros et al. 2013, 2-3). Brazil’s economy is easily affected by raw materials and energy prices in the international market, which is the main cause of Brazil’s economic slowdown in recent years.

The basic policy orientation of this kind of economy is not improved after economic integration of South America. For example, the two big countries of MERCOSUR, Brazil and Argentina, have differences because of the trade barrier of both parties over the recent years; Argentina implemented the protection measure of non-automatic import licensing, and in turn, Brazil was limited to the import of Argentina’s food, including apples, raisins, potatoes, flour, and wine in May 2012(Xiang Jun 2013). However, this pattern of economic development determines Brazil’s attitude toward the US and the EU by drawing the EU to enter the European market to compete with the US.

The third condition is whether external support is available. Brazil often maintains close ties with European countries because of geography, culture, race, among other reasons. European countries can provide an effective assistance to the US. However, if the interest front of the US and the EU are different because of Latin America, then getting the support of the EU will be changed as it counters the pressure from the US. This condition will vary the factors. Another support is from the alliance of Brazil and emerging countries like China, which has become the main export market of raw materials and agricultural products of Brazil. In the early 21st century, the trade between Brazil with its rich natural resources, and China, which is in urgent need of raw materials, grew rapidly. With a new market in China, Brazil reduced its export dependence on European market. Brazil has also established cooperative relations with Russia and India, and built a three-country forum with India and South Africa. With the expansion of ties with the Southern states, Brazil will have more room to take a balancing strategy.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

This paper discusses the differences in the bilateral position between Brazil and the EU in terms of international issues, namely, trade, development, environmental change, and security. Both parties use normative power to restrain to offset the strong military and economic capacity that the US demonstrates. This move becomes an opportunity for the alliance. By understanding the role and function of the normative power in a global unipolar system, the use of soft balancing as the demonstration of the bilateral strategic partnership between Brazil and the EU may be a more apt explanation.

Second, this paper explains the transition of the relationship between Brazil and the EU in terms of the formation of leader concept, the construction of system, and power orientation. The failure of the negotiation on free trade between the EU and MERCOSUR led Brazil to transit to the South–South political development and traverse the EU, South America, Asia, and the main camps to flexibly use the alliance, to balance the development of all powers, and to maximize the national interest. The deadlock of free trade negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR is surmountable. Both parties have a similar concept a common vision, and goal. The key is whether the EU is willing to give up the region-to-region negotiation strategy with MERCOSUR, which will be replaced by bilateral trade negotiations. The experiences of trade negotiations among the EU and Central America, Columbia, Peru, and India help both parties to seek a model which will not only strengthen their respective external influence, but will also promote their mutual interests. One factor is the interaction among the EU, China, and India. The second factor is the development of bilateral relations between the EU and Brazil. The relation is divided into two entities that are sometimes cooperative and other times, competitive. For example, Brazil agreed with the EU in the development and climate change issues, but did not concur in the practice of anti-Western political and military interventions on security issues.

After the abovementioned concept is used to explain inter-regional interaction between Brazil and the EU, findings show that if regional interdependence degree is higher, then willingness for inter-regional cooperation is higher. This form of inter-regional cooperation is subject to mutual competition among regions, and the perception of threats from the outside, which deepens inter-regional power-balanced development and cooperation. The logic of soft balancing is used to show the characteristics of a strategic alliance that is formed because of different issues.

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